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Intelligent Island Discourse: Singapore’s
Discursive Negotiation With Technology
Alwyn Lim
National University of Singapore
The small nation-state of Singapore has increas-
ingly been referred to in the popular media as the
Intelligent Island of the future. With significant state
investment in the promotion and dissemination of
information-communications technology and atten-
dant social ramifications, this has become an area that
can no longer be ignored or taken for granted. This ar-
ticle intends to map the conditions of possibility on
which Singapore can be conceived of as an Intelligent
Island, in situating the role of information technology
and Intelligent Island discourse within the discourses
of postcoloniality, technocapitalism, late modernity,
and globalization. In particular, this article attempts
to show how, in Intelligent Island discourse, the pro-
cesses of the construction of a Singaporean nation are
intricately linked to the shift in political discourse from
mobilizing a rhetoric of crisis to one of utopianism.
Key words: Intelligent Island, technology, discourse,
nation-building, crisis, utopia
On April 2, 1992, the National Computer Board
(NCB) of Singapore announced its IT2000 vision and
plans, which made the headlines of The Straits Times
with “Computer links for all in 15 years”:
In about 15 years, virtually every home, office,
school and factory here will be interconnected
through computers, giving Singaporeans quick
and easy access to a wide range of services and
information through a voice command or touch
of a button. For instance, they can do their shop-
ping and pay for the goods bought from home. If
they are going out, they can use the computer sys-
tem to plan their route and find out which roads to
avoid because of congestion. This is the vision as
spelt out in the Government’s IT2000 plan, which
envisages turning the Republic into an “intelli-
gent” island in 15 years. (Lim, 1992, p. 1)
June 1998 saw the commercial launch of Singapore
ONE, which is a national initiative to deliver a new
level of interactive, multimedia applications and ser-
vices to homes, businesses, and schools throughout
Singapore. It is one of the first few implementations of
multimedia broadband networks and applications in
the world:
It will help Singapore stay at the cutting edge of
the digital age: redefining lifestyles, reinventing
work and leisure, and powering the country’s
economic engine. As an extension of Singa-
pore’s IT2000 Masterplan in transforming the
country into an Intelligent Island where informa-
tion technology (IT) is exploited to the fullest to
enhance the quality of life of the population at
home, work and play. . . . Singapore ONE is a
major milestone in the realization of this vision.
(www.s-one.gov.sg)
Information-communications technology (ICT),
the Intelligent Island, and the information age/
knowledge-based economy have become common
tropes through which the image of Singapore and its
body social are articulated, highlighting the seeming
ubiquity of science and technology in Singapore soci-
ety. In light of the statements above, the hope and aim
of this article is to interrogate how we speak of Singa-
pore as an intelligent island—what I refer to as Intelli-
gent Island discourse—and to critique the representa-
tions of these technological networks and how they
serve to (re)construct and (re)configure the way Singa-
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pore society is represented. In so doing, I hope to em-
phasize how the changing social experience with the
onset of Intelligent Island discourse is implicated, for
example, in how Intelligent Island discourse acts as a
conduit for governmental and political technologies in
disciplining and constituting the body social.
My starting point is the acknowledgement of what
has often been referred to as the permeation of most
realms of social and cultural life with information-
communications technology in contemporary devel-
oped societies (cf. Aronowitz, Martinsons, & Menser,
1996; Baudrillard, 1993, 1994; Bell, 1973; Castells,
1989, 1996, 1997, 1998; Ellul, 1964; Heidegger, 1977;
Lyon, 1988; Poster, 1990; Postman, 1993; Webster,
1995).1,2 Yet, I hope to take this reflection further and
argue that various institutions, such as the media,
advertisements, and selected texts, significantly con-
tribute to this ubiquity.
Intelligent Island discourse, like all manners of dis-
course, comes with its sustaining institutions, vocabu-
lary, imagery, and principles. Sites are opened up
where statements are made and views authoritatively
disseminated; it is constantly (though not always in
similar ways) structured, represented and elaborated
on. Indeed, it is a constructed body of theory and prac-
tice in which there is a significant material dimension,
which in turn constitutes systems of knowledge and
grids of specification and normalization.
The Body Electronic
The body electronic is the notion of Singapore as
“electronically invested,” and it is my argument that
this notion runs parallel to other formations such as the
body social or the body politic—it is the technological
dimension of Singapore society and how it is selec-
tively and particularly represented via tropes, imagery,
and texts. This conception of the body electronic of
Singapore can thus be surveyed and problematized
sociologically, geographically, economically, politi-
cally, and historically. The sociological approach I
undertake is subsequently informed to a large extent
by these other disciplines and discourses.
The Intelligent Island
as Discursive Formation
One can only understand the complex role that
information-communications technology plays in
constituting or even (re)structuring Singapore society
and its far-reaching implications by first examining
Singapore as an Intelligent Island as discourse via its
textual exteriority. By discursive, I mean to show how
Intelligent Island discourse is complexly, intricately,
and even antagonistically represented. By formation, I
mean two things: First, how the idea and image of the
Intelligent Island is constructed, and second, how this
construction is supported to the extent that it consti-
tutes a coherent body.
It would become increasingly clear in the sections
that follow that Intelligent Island discourse is not
merely about information-communications technol-
ogy and its physical aspects per se, but part of an over-
all strategy and contested site that appropriates and
links up with discourses of nation-building, the notion
of defining a postcolonial identity of social self, and
narratives of late modernity and what Anne
McClintock (1995) calls “the Angel of Progress.”
Situating Intelligent
Island Discourse
Discourse abhors a vacuum because no utterance is
possible without a discursive formation constraining it
and, simultaneously, inciting it to produce. Conse-
quently, how we speak of Singapore as an Intelligent
Island can only be possible given the dynamic
exchange between articulation and the sociohistorical
conditions on which this discourse is (re)negotiated
(cf. Foucault, 1972, 1973; Giddens, 1984, 1990, 1991;
Mannheim, 1936).
Given the immensely dense and complex nature of
the empirical data in question, it was nevertheless pos-
sible to identify four general lines of discursive articu-
lation from the various texts that were studied—
postcoloniality, globalization, late modernity, and
technocapitalism. To the extent where these four dis-
courses intersect and traverse each other, a discursive
site is opened up where Intelligent Island discourse
can be articulated and elaborated on.
These four nodes do not refer to the phenomena as
they are in empirical reality but rather the discourses
that surround them and appropriate them—the dis-
courses of postcolonialism, globalization, modernity,
and technocapitalism. Furthermore, the four nodes do
not represent a totalizing, unitary structure that
encompasses Intelligent Island discourse.3 Instead, it
is precisely where these four nodes of discourses tra-
verse each other that a discursive location is opened
up—this is where Intelligent Island discourse takes
place. It is on this site that we are able to (discursively)
articulate the notion of Singapore as an Intelligent
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Island, and it is useful to situate this model throughout
this article as a mental map, guide, and perspective.
Postcoloniality
Allegorically, the term postcolonialism presents
history as a series of stages from the precolonial to the
colonial to the postcolonial—a usually unquestioning
commitment to linear time and the idea of progress and
development. “Metaphorically poised on the border
between old and new, end and beginning, the term her-
alds the end of a world era but by invoking the very
same trope of linear progress which animated that era”
(McClintock, 1995, p. 10). Indeed, Akhil Gupta (1998,
p. 6) questions whether there is in fact a “postcolonial
condition” and notes the (ab)uses of the notion of
“postcoloniality” (also Childs & Williams, 1997,
pp. 1-25; Mishra & Hodge, 1991; Spivak, 1999).
For our purposes, these shifts in the nature of
postcoloniality draw attention to the imprint of the dif-
fering tempos of the end of formal colonial rule on di-
verse places (Gupta, 1998, p. 23) and the conse-
quences they have for young nation-states, like
Singapore, struggling to define their identity and to
construct a citizenship. Nationalism, as Ernest Gellner
(1983) notes, invents nations where they do not exist,
and most modern nations, despite their appeal to an
eminent and immemorial past, are of recent invention
(cf. Hobsbawm & Ranger, 1989; Hui & Tong, 1997).
Singapore is certainly no exception:
August 9, 1965 was a “moment of anguish” for
all citizens of Singapore, who discovered sud-
denly that they had been cast off from the federa-
tion of Malaysia. Singapore had merged with
Malaysia in September 1963 in the belief that
this was the only viable way for it to gain inde-
pendence from the British and survive economi-
cally. (“Suddenly, S’pore is independent,”
1998, 30)
Certainly, the inscription of history around a single
“continuity of preoccupations” and “a common past”
runs the risk of “a fetishistic disavowal of crucial inter-
national distinctions that are barely understood and in-
adequately theorised” (McClintock, 1995, p. 12), but
interrogating the notions of nation and nation-building
within the discourse of postcoloniality can help shed
light on Singapore’s postcolonial condition.
Globalization
Globalization is certainly an intellectual field gain-
ing much academic currency (cf. Albrow, 1997;
Featherstone, 1990; Featherstone, Lash, & Robertson,
1995; Hannerz, 1996; Robertson, 1992; Robertson &
Khondker, 1998; Scott, 1997). In relation to this work,
globalization should be surveyed with respect to the
globalizing of informational networks, linkages, flows
of information (Castells, 1997), and complex
connectivities (Tomlinson, 1999).
This requires us to acknowledge a “global-human
condition” and the “world-as-a-whole” in all its “com-
plexity and structural contingency” (Robertson, 1990,
pp. 17-18). Succinctly, the globalizing process de-
scribes “the ways in which the world ‘moved’ from be-
ing merely ‘in itself’ to the problem or the possibility
of its being ‘for itself’ ” (Robertson, 1990, p. 23).
Many academics have made light of the apparent di-
chotomous opposition between the global and the lo-
cal (Axford, 1996; Cvetkovich & Kellner, 1997;
Vayrynen, 1997) and here, it is Robertson’s (1995)
critical insight that is indispensable:
The debate about global homogenisation versus
heterogenisation should be transcended. It is not
a question of either homogenisation or
heterogenisation, but rather of the ways in which
both these two tendencies have become features
of life across much of the late-twentieth century
world . . . the ways in which homogenising and
heterogenising tendencies are mutually
implicative. (p. 27)4
It is this view that globalizing tendencies produce
and reinscribe locality, tradition, culture, difference,
and how global informational flows are assimilated lo-
cally that propagates the idea that the Intelligent Island
is the unique product of Singaporean achievements in
exploiting information-communications technology—
its status as port/airport/financial hub/and so on, its
utopian drive to be the best in the world while stem-
ming out negative Western influences and/or values.
We can situate Singapore in this global context and
map its sociohistorical space in the global economy as
a young, independent nation that was at once involved
in a global situation with her independence, one that
she had to succumb to and exploit simultaneously for
her economic survival.5
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Late Modernity
Sidestepping contentious debates that (de)center
around modernism and postmodernism (cf. Koertge,
1998; Sokal & Bricmont, 1998), I prefer a more con-
servative approach to a perspective on modernism and
modernity. This view acknowledges the radical
disjunctures that have been brought to bear on society
through information-communications technology but,
simultaneously, sees essential continuities that,
though restructured, nevertheless remain significant
(Giddens, 1990, 1991; Habermas, 1987a, 1989;
Harvey, 1989; Schiller, 1984). Specifically, I concen-
trate on the sociocultural dimensions of late moder-
nity, what Fredric Jameson (1991) calls “the cultural
logic of late capitalism.”
It should be apparent that aspects of late modernity
are intricately implicated with discourses on global-
ization and postcoloniality. Robertson (1995), for
example, suggests that “globality is the general condi-
tion which has facilitated the diffusion of ‘general
modernity’ ” (p. 27). Whereas Jameson (1991) associ-
ates this cultural logic of late modernity with a utopian
Weltanschauung (as is strikingly evident in Intelligent
Island discourse), his position on its cultural
depthlessness careless of historical time highlights the
need to acknowledge the dimensions of how historical
narratives are discursively invested and constitutive of
our spatiotemporal location in the here and now.
In particular, I wish to develop on a sociocultural as-
pect of late modernity—the utopian mentality, the
“Angel of Progress”—and how the discourses on
progress and development are deeply embroiled in In-
telligent Island discourse. For instance,
The vision of the Intelligent Island is based on
the far-reaching use of IT. It sees Singaporeans
tapping into a vast well of electronically-stored
information and services which they can use to
their best ends—to improve their business, to
make their work easier and to enhance their per-
sonal and social lives. (National Computer
Board, 1992, p. vii)
Situating Intelligent Island discourse within develop-
ment discourses, practices, institutions, and narratives
of progress and technoscientific advancement allows
us to interrogate the discursive construction of the In-
telligent Island and how these texts and practices ap-
propriate materially invested accounts of nation-
building and local histories.
Technocapitalism
Systematic discussions into the changing nature of
capitalism in the information age highlight the mutu-
ally implicative dimensions of information-communi-
cations technology and capitalism today (Appadurai,
1996; Bell, 1973, 1976; Castells, 1989, 1996, 1997,
1998; Castells & Hall, 1994; Harvey, 1993; Kellner,
1989; Marsden, 1999; Poster, 1990; Schiller, 1986).
Although much of this academic dialogue informs the
discourse on what Douglas Kellner (1989, p. 178) calls
technocapitalism, what I have chosen to emphasize is
not technocapitalism as a totality or new mode of capi-
talism but to acknowledge that it is but one form of
capitalism among many other constituent variants.
Therefore, it is not merely the physical characteris-
tics and networks that constitute the form of capitalism
that relies on information-communications technol-
ogy but also the social relations mediated by and
through the (ab)use of such technology, which enables
the simultaneous deterritorialization and reterritorial-
ization of economic markets as well as cultures.
Technocapitalism, for our purposes, is the form of capi-
talism that relies on information-communications tech-
nology both in its conception and dissemination.
This dimension of the changing nature of global
capitalism is built on “the rapid development of com-
munication technologies and the tighter interconnec-
tion of financial markets, multilateral institutions and
development orthodoxy shifted to the advocacy of
neoliberal positions” (Gupta, 1998, p. 13). Further res-
onances with postcoloniality can be made with
technocapitalism’s reliance on “high technology . . . to
maintain the tension between . . . phenomena, demon-
strating how a conjunctural analysis of postcoloniality
can attend to moments of both articulation and
disarticulation” in this global frame of reference
(Gupta, 1998, p. 14).
References to the use of information-communica-
tions technology and its capitalistic aspects are rife in
Intelligent Island discourse (see Jussawalla, 1990). To
take two examples, the promotion of “technopreneur-
ship” and use of information-communications technol-
ogy in small-medium enterprises in Singapore (Bjerke,
1998; Hwa, 1990, pp. 25-26; Tan, 1997) point to the
extent that discourses of technocapitalism intersect with
Intelligent Island discourse.
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The Question
Concerning Technology
The intersection of these four discourses and how
they are appropriated and synthesized by Intelligent
Island discourse thus opens the site whereby we can
make sense of the sociocultural implications of
speaking of Singapore as an Intelligent Island. It is
therefore not a question of if we are entering the
information age, if Singapore is an Intelligent Island,
if we are turning people into machines, or if there is
increased surveillance and social control—we have
to show how it is even possible that the question of
technology is a question, to interrogate the ways that
we might even begin to speak of an Intelligent Island.
This can be achieved through showing how the ques-
tion of technology and Intelligent Island discourse is
put together and (re)negotiated within and between
texts.
The Body
Electronic in Discourse
Many academics are of the assumption that the rev-
olutionary impact of information-communications
technology constitutes a rare interval in history (see
Castells, 1996, p. 29). The small island nation-state of
Singapore seems to be no exception where this is con-
cerned. This is the broader site in which discourses on
globalization (the global flows of information and
communication) and technocapitalism (the prolifera-
tion and reliance on these technological networks) are
inscribed within Intelligent Island discourse.
However, our concern here is not with the global
propagation of “technopoles” (Castells & Hall, 1994)
in a Singaporean framework but, rather, to consider
how Intelligent Island discourse is constituted and
elaborated on, in particular, making the interlinkages
between the various statements or serious speech acts
in which Singapore as Intelligent Island is impli-
cated. Attention will be focused on how the discur-
sive, institutional construction of the Intelligent
Island forms part of broader strategies of nation-
building and negotiating national identity in Singa-
pore to create a specifically national high-technology
environment. This is the specific discursive space
where Intelligent Island discourse is informed by for-
mations of late modernity (the idea of progress and
development) and postcoloniality (problems with
defining the nation).
Intelligent Island Discipline:
Exemplary Spaces
Research in the field of cultural geography has
interrogated the ways in which national identity may
be negotiated in the representations and landscape
imagery in various media (cf. Daniels, 1993; Matless,
1998, pp. 62-102). The elaboration of Intelligent
Island discourse in these various texts constitutes what
Tim Bunnell (1999a) calls “exemplary spaces”—rep-
resentational sites that (re)define national forms and
norms. To this extent, we can suggest that the popular
discourse of Singapore as Intelligent Island, supported
by its specifically utopian rhetoric, serves as such an
exemplary space.
In particular, it is a central argument throughout this
article that Intelligent Island discourse has specific
disciplinary functions in mapping out the ideal repre-
sentation of Singapore and her boundaries. These tex-
tual as well as other discursive representations consti-
tute a normalization that (re)defines Singapore and her
people in the new millennium.
Governmentality:
Broad Rationalities
The governmentality perspective has been particu-
larly useful in attempting to come to terms with the
ways in which Intelligent Island discourse, in its
textuality, invests such exemplary spaces. Literature
on the governmentality perspective makes the allusion
to and draws on the later work of Michel Foucault,
especially his deliberations on power/knowledge
(Barnett, 1999; Bunnell, 1999a, 1999b; Miller & Rose,
1990; N. Rose, 1994, 1996; N. Rose & Miller, 1992).6
The aim of national governance is “how citizens can
be induced to use their freedom productively, effec-
tively, appropriately—the way in which individuals’
aims and objectives can be brought in line with those
of the state” (Bunnell, 1999a, 1999b) or, in Foucault’s
(1997) words, government can be understood broadly
as “techniques and procedures for directing human
behaviour” (p. 81).
Although governmentality is not explicitly a the-
ory of the state, it still seeks to interrogate the role of
the state in the government of the national popula-
tion. The governmentality perspective thus acknowl-
edges the role that nonstate actors have in negotiating
the rationalities of government (Miller & Rose,
1990). Correspondingly, Intelligent Island discourse
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as an exemplary space can be problematized by ana-
lyzing both broad rationalities and specific programs
of government.
(Re)defining National
Forms and Norms
The broad rationalities that can be discerned in In-
telligent Island discourse constitute specifically na-
tional forms, even though they often allude to and ap-
propriate discourses of globalization:
Through monitoring global technological, pol-
icy trends, and developments in telecommunica-
tions infrastructure and services, Singapore
would be able to keep abreast of global develop-
ments in info-communications infrastructure
and proactively develop strategies to ensure
advanced linkages. (www.ida.gov.sg; emphasis
added)7
In particular, the narratives that inform the birth and
(re)construction of postcolonial Singapore, the de-
ployment of specific tropes of crisis and survival, and
the utopian rhetoric that is invested by such narratives
and tropes, constitute the exemplary space that is
opened up by Intelligent Island discourse. From the
governmentality perspective, Intelligent Island dis-
course is to be made intelligible not merely as a repre-
sentation of exemplary conduct but as part of a govern-
mental process of its realization and propagation.
These various texts and representations can thus be
seen to normalize a postcolonial, national landscape
for Singapore, which is articulated in Intelligent Island
discourse. The boundaries and limits of Singapore as a
nation are redrawn and redefined—this particular rep-
resentation of Singapore as an Intelligent Island poised
strategically as a regional hub on the global electronic
highway is qualitatively different from the conception
of Singapore as, say, the maritime gateway to South-
east Asia and tax haven for transnational manufactur-
ing plants (even though there are the obvious continui-
ties that are discursively contended). With the global
diaspora of information-communications technology,
the integration into this global economy is made sig-
nificant and yet, paradoxically, the boundaries of the
Intelligent Island are further inscribed as a result of
this global condition:
Early bonding of heartlanders and cosmopoli-
tans is crucial for Singapore to succeed in the
knowledge-based economy, says SM Lee Kuan
Yew . . . “In the knowledge-based economy, Sin-
gapore must have talent able to compete glob-
ally.” (“Singapore 21,” 1999, 31)
Of course, the discursive representations of Intelli-
gent Island discourse do not merely allude to a
technologization or informatization of Singapore (see
Kuo, 1990)8—they constitute, incite, and normalize
this representation and idea of the Intelligent Island by
promoting and endorsing a particular form of high-
technology urbanity and the requisite behavior and
conduct to achieve this utopian vision. In other words,
discourses of late modernity and technocapitalism are
implicated in Intelligent Island discourse where disci-
plinary functions are operationalized. For example,
Even in a knowledge-based economy, the wealth
of a people does not depend only on how much
scientific and technological knowledge they pos-
sess. It depends also on social cohesion, political
stability and the collective will, values, and atti-
tudes—the “heartware” [a play on “hardware”]
that determines whether this knowledge can be
harnessed for the good of all. Singaporeans must
be strong and supple enough to withstand the rapid
changes of the 21st century and innovative and
imaginative enough to thrive on them, but we must
also be caring and cohesive enough to grow as one
united people, overcoming adversity and prosper-
ing together. (part of the Singapore 21 Vision,
www.gov.sg/singapore21/keyideas5.html)
Certainly, “from time to time the PAP government has
indeed involved itself in manipulating the symbolic
content of national identity, but it has never lost sight
of the material and utilitarian objectives in nation
building” (Hill & Fee, 1995, p. 244).
The rest of this article will then attempt to describe
and interrogate these broad rationalities of
governmentality by accounting for (a) the historical
narratives of postindependence Singapore, in particu-
lar, the significance given to her economic dimension
and the ideology of survival; (b) the popular discourse
on Singapore as an Intelligent Island, including the
attempts to articulate conceptions of a high-technol-
ogy urbanity and the corresponding deployment of cri-
sis and survival motifs; and (c) the utopian rhetoric
employed in negotiating a postcolonial national iden-
tity and the links that Intelligent Island discourse has
with other conceptions of Singapore as a unitary entity.
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Postcolonial Singapore:
Birth and (Re)Construction
The genesis of independent Singapore is part of a
narrative that is not only contentious in its historical
representation, but also subject to constant negotiation
(see for example Huat, 1995, 1996; Fletcher, 1969;
Hill & Fee, 1995; Lau, 1992; Fee, 1999; Tremewan,
1994). Nevertheless, it is precisely this particular his-
torical narrative, in its rhetorical discursivity, that sets
the conditions for what might later be articulated in
Intelligent Island discourse. In particular, it is how dis-
courses on globalizing economic forces and advance-
ments in science and technology are appropriated by
ideas of progress and attempts at nation-building. Not
denying the probability that more than an economic
logic was historically constituent, I choose instead to
focus on what amounts to a significant rhetoric in dis-
course around how issues of economic survival were
employed in narrative and are deployed in tropes of
progress later in Intelligent Island discourse.
Self-government from the British in 1959 marked
the birth of postcolonial Singapore, in so far as concep-
tions of nationhood are articulated, with the People’s
Action Party (PAP) rising to government. Merger with
Malaya was almost immediately on the Singapore
government’s political agenda in light of the precari-
ous economic circumstances due to her lack of natural
resources and small regional economic base. Despite
the Malayan government’s reservations about the
political cry for merger (largely due to racial issues and
the Communist threat), inclusion in the Malaysian
Federation was finally settled in 1963. However, the
political ambitions of the PAP had alarmed the ruling
United Malays National Organization (UMNO),
which then led to the expulsion of Singapore from
Malaysia in 1965 (Boi, 1998; Chew & Lee, 1991;
Turnbull, 1977; also see www.knowledgenet.com.sg).
The Onset of Independence
With the abrupt mantle of independence thrust on
Singapore, the PAP government was at once faced
with several simultaneous predicaments—to ensure
economic survival and stability in an already decolo-
nizing post–World War II region and to begin the ardu-
ous task of nation-building, which also meant negoti-
ating problems of securing a stable citizenship and
overcoming politically thorny issues of ethnicity in a
largely diverse immigrant population. Indeed, the cir-
cumstances for the young nation-state became more
urgent when, in 1968, the British Government sud-
denly decided to accelerate the withdrawal of its
military presence within 3 years: This meant that an
estimated one fifth of the island’s national income and
40,000 jobs that were generated by the British bases
would be forfeited (Castells, 1992, p. 52; Murray &
Perera, 1995, p. 16).
The economic insecurity of Singapore’s sudden in-
dependence are consistently expressed through crisis
motifs and the ideology of survival:
The gist of the Singapore solution was plain and
straightforward—Industrialise or Bust!
(Devan-Nair, 1973, p. 65)
And my responsibility after 1965 was to enable
then 2 1/2, now 3 1/2 million, Singaporeans to
live. We were cut off from our hinterland. We had
confrontation from Indonesia. The Malaysians
were going to bypass us. We had to create a new
economy. (Lee Kuan Yew in “My son won’t be
another LKY,” 1999, p. 47)
It is the constant evocation of such tropes of eco-
nomic endurance that would later be echoed in Intelli-
gent Island discourse.
Strategies to deal with this sense of economic crisis
were prudently deployed by the PAP government—the
process of industrialization was hastened to facilitate
the further integration of the Singapore economy into
the world capitalist formation. Favorable policies and
economic incentives were established to attract the
material investment of transnational corporations
(TNCs), which also meant that a large proportion of
the population had to be mobilized and disciplined
through a combined scheme of mass education, labor
unions, and labor development programs (Castells,
1992, pp. 35-37, 53). Clearly, the drive to industrialize
meant that this economic rhetoric was informed and
invested at once by the acknowledgement of global
economic flows, and a faith in the engagement of
technology.
Restructuring and Reconfiguring
This investment of discourses would be a crucial
factor in the economic organization and subsequent
restructuring that was sensitive to global conditions as
well as more regional, geopolitical issues. Up to the
mid-1980s, Singapore’s economic development fol-
lowed what must have been a conventional model:
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basic industrialization (1966-1973), sophistication
and broadening of the industrial base (1974-1978),
and restructuring of the economy to higher value-
added industries and services (1979-1984) (Murray &
Perera, 1995, p. 25, cf. Castells, 1992, pp. 54-55). In
fact, the restructuring policy succeeded in achieving
some of its goals, including rapid growth between
1980 and 1984, much higher than in the other Asian
New Industrializing Economies (NIEs).
However, the severe recession in 1985-1986 led to
the convening of a special high-level economic com-
mittee and new directions for the economy were
charted. It is significant that two of the new growth ar-
eas identified were the high-tech industry and infor-
mation technology. Despite the fact that manufactur-
ing and other industries are still a large part of
economic development in Singapore, the rhetoric em-
ployed in Intelligent Island discourse suggests that the
evolution into a high-technology, service-based
knowledge economy is the main logic at work:
Rapid technological progress has revolutionised
the world economy, creating new growth areas.
Singapore has accordingly embarked on a major
development thrust to build up a strong indige-
nous science and technology base to support
high-tech industries and to innovate and create
new products and processes. In particular, the
Government recognizes the need for Singapore
to be early adopters of information technology
(IT) and innovators of IT applications for the
economy to remain vibrant and competitive. IT is
being pursued vigorously in the drive to trans-
form Singapore into an IT megahub. (www.sg/
flavour/profile/pro-econdev.html)
Here it is explicitly indicated that the revolution in the
world economy has direct implications for the Singa-
pore economy, an acknowledgement of globalization
discourses on the networked and interconnected logic
of technocapitalism. With the advent of Singapore
ONE, this form of expression becomes more convicted:
Singapore’s strategic location and dynamic prog-
ress have helped the nation to become an interna-
tional hub. Singapore evolved through manufac-
turing, transportation, commerce, finance and
communications phases. Singapore ONE, is a
strategic move to prepare the nation for the broad-
band network age, as a hub for the knowledge-
based economy of the next millennium. (www.
s-one.gov.sg/overview/evo01.html)
Singapore is a small country. Almost without a
significant domestic market. The way the Singa-
pore economy has been able to grow over the last
20-30 years, basically was by making sure that
Singapore will remain relevant to the regional
and global economies. (Mr. Lim Swee Say, Min-
ister of State, Computerworld, 2000, p. 77)
The economic drive of postcolonial Singapore is
not the only dimension emphasized in discourse and
narrative. It is apparent how, in the (re)construction of
her postcolonial condition through the reconfiguration
of her economy, information-communications tech-
nology is expressed as the key to her future, thereby
implicating discourses of globalization and
technocapitalism.
Popular Discourse
on the Intelligent Island
It is commonplace to speak of Singapore as Intelli-
gent Island, or of her transition to a knowledge-based
economy or information age. In fact, the Intelligent Is-
land is often represented discursively as a unitary en-
tity with its various electronic networks (TradeNet,
EduNet, Electronic Road Pricing, smart cards, elec-
tronic fund transfer systems, etc.) acting as its arteries.
Indeed, the empirical reality of this seems more truism
than myth today:
To the extent that Singapore has become one of
the most highly computerised nations in the
world, with a burgeoning IT industry and a track
record of sophisticated, sometimes world-
beating, IT applications in business and govern-
ment, Singapore’s computer policy management
may be judged a success. (Choo, 1997, p. 58)
Singapore is moving into the information age,
considering the type of new technological prod-
ucts that are coming up everyday. IT’s roles are
far-ranging from a supportive one to a critical
one. Initially, IT may only play a part in our day
to day lives such as normal word processing. At
the moment, and quite sure in the future, it is
going to be an inseparable part of our lives. (An
informant from a local broadcasting authority)
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Even though there occur pockets of the body social
that remain relatively untouched by information-
communications technology, there is no denying that
electronic networks traverse the entire island—from
the Mass Rapid Transit system to the computerized
port facilities to the everyday level of Singapore Cable
Vision in the home—in other words, an effectively
all-wired society (Murray & Perera, 1995, pp. 152-
171). Regardless of the technical specificities, this way
of articulating Singapore as Intelligent Island is exten-
sive in discourse and is distinctively utopian:
Singapore, like many other countries, is seeking
out technology for economic restructuring and is
moving inexorably into the information society
in which information networks and databanks
will be the arteries and heart of economic and
social life. (National IT Working Committee,
1985, p. 25)
Singapore is wasting no time to exploit this new
sector called the information and communica-
tions industry (ICT), which is fast becoming an
important cog in the Republic’s quest to become
a knowledge-based economy. (Chng, 1999, p. 1)
Despite the anticipated social problems, Singa-
pore cannot avoid becoming an information soci-
ety. The strategic position of Singapore as an
international telecommunication node, the open-
ness of the economy to international influences,
the desire for a higher standard of living and the
push to be a brain center blends well with the
requirements of becoming an information soci-
ety, the society of the future. (National IT
Working Committee, 1985, p. 30)
Here, we can discern not only that (a) the transition
to an Intelligent Island is inevitable and essential but
also that (b) this fundamental change is a transnational
one and potentially global in nature, and (c) that this
shift relies on a particular mode of economy that is de-
termined to a large extent by flows of information-
communications technology. Popular discourse on
Singapore as Intelligent Island, for our purposes, is
predicated on the belief in and the rhetoric on a rapidly
occurring and fundamental shift in the way the world is
epistemologically, economically, culturally, and
spatio-temporally ordered and experienced.
In this sense, the discursive structure of Intelligent
Island discourse can be understood from the rhetorical
dimensions of the texts I have chosen to look at (cf.
R. Brown, 1987, pp. 80-96). In other words, my analy-
sis has been geared to interrogate how the survival and
crisis motifs that are employed in the process of
nation-building are discursively deployed in Intelli-
gent Island discourse. These often take on specifically
economic proportions, which can be made compre-
hensible given Singapore’s precarious economic situ-
ation with her independence in 1965.9 It is through
such representations, I argue, that the use and exploita-
tion of information-communications technology in
Singapore is made necessary for her survival and
future, and therefore to processes of nation-building
and defining national identity.
“The Future Is Available Now”10
In fact, the utopian rhetoric deployed might just be
the epitome of Intelligent Island discourse. The discur-
sive space that it occupies appropriates and relies on
common tropes of a high-technology urbanity:
It is small wonder then that the new target market
for e-consultants is Singapore, voted the World’s
Most Intelligent City in September [1999] by the
World Teleport Association. (Chng, 1999, p. 1)
The impact of IT will be all pervasive with signif-
icant social and cultural changes taking place in
Singapore’s society . . . in the office environ-
ment . . . in factories . . . in the service indus-
try . . . in personal services . . . in the home of the
future. (National IT Working Committee, 1985,
p. v)
IDA’s [Infocomm Development Authority]
vision is “Singapore—where the digital future
is.” The organisation’s mission is to spearhead
Singapore’s drive to be a vital global info-com-
munications centre, catalysing Singapore’s
transformation into a knowledge-based digital
economy and society, in order to realise the bene-
fits of the digital future. (www.ida.gov.sg)
The deployment of such tropes is persuasively pre-
sented, but only if we bear in mind that they are articu-
lated within discourses of late modernity, with empha-
ses on notions of progress and development; in other
words, the mapping out of a utopian high-technology
condition. Intelligent Island discourse is articulated
within and between these texts with the constant refer-
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ences to the inevitability of the information age and,
correspondingly, to the ubiquity of science and (infor-
mation-communications) technology, as the new ma-
terial and cultural formation. Indeed, IDA’s singular
conviction is to be “totally committed and passionate
in our drive to secure Singapore firmly in tomorrow’s
digital age, today” (IDA, n.d.). The subtle play on the
words tomorrow and today (much like Singapore
ONE’s “The future is available now”) collapses the
distinction between time frames and suggests that the
utopian dream of an Intelligent Island is not only pos-
sible, but highly probable, given the cooperation and
active participation of Singapore(ans).11
The fundamental nature and role of information-
communications technology is further reiterated in In-
telligent Island discourse as the key factor not only in
Singapore’s economic success and future, but also in
accounting for the ways in which the nature of technol-
ogy has evolved. As Mr. Lim Swee Say, Minister of
State at the Ministry of Communications and Informa-
tion Technology, lucidly stated:
[We] believe that the convergence of IT, telecom-
munications, consumer electronics and all that,
into what we broadly call info-communications
technology (ICT) can present us with an oppor-
tunity to nurture ICT into the key growth eco-
nomic sector in Singapore. And I emphasise,
“the.” We have many growth sectors but we think
ICT can be the key growth sector because of the
fast changing nature of technology and the per-
vasiveness of technology, as well as our founda-
tion in this area. (“At the forefront,” 1999, pp. 77)
The recourse to such tropes and references to a
high-technology future as the inevitable future for Sin-
gapore can be said to constitute much of the popular
discourse on Singapore as Intelligent Island.
The Rhetoric of
Crisis and Survival
The intimate link between nation-building and
industrialization has been made by both Hill and Fee
(1995, p. 20) and Ernest Gellner (1983, p. 55) on how
the conception of nation might be articulated in the
process of the homogenizing tendencies of industrial-
ization. Yet, my intention is to take this argument fur-
ther by suggesting that this articulation is similarly
advanced in Intelligent Island discourse through the
deployment of crisis and survival motifs (especially in
their economic dimensions) and, thereby, with the
manipulation of the cultural-symbolic aspects of
nation-building.12 The social construction of the
nation is thus coterminous with the elaboration of
Intelligent Island discourse, which we can identify as
“the rhetoric of nationhood as political strategy” (cf.
Hill & Fee, 1995, p. 244).
The argument for the ubiquity, and indeed the
necessity, of science and technology in Singapore and
her economic future is primarily operationalized
through the rhetoric of economic survival and expedi-
ency, given the changing global economic slant toward
the exploitation of information-communications tech-
nology. However, this rhetoric is also coupled with the
belief that “Singapore has a ‘better chance’ of making
it now” (“My son won’t be another LKY,” 1999).
The manipulation of such culturally symbolic con-
tent is not new given the popular historical narratives
of Singapore’s sudden independence with her separa-
tion from the Malaysian Federation. The deployment
of this rhetoric is unique, however, in Intelligent Island
discourse because, as will be shown in the next section,
the various tropes and references to economic survival
and well-being are synthesized to focus on an explic-
itly utopian and forward-looking worldview. The dif-
fusion of crisis motifs and rhetoric reflect an “ideology
of survival” (Chee, 1971; Castells, 1992, p. 58) that, al-
though not particular to Intelligent Island discourse, is
extensive in the texts that refer to the contingency of
Singapore’s position:
It is no longer a question of whether we should or
should not exploit IT. The real issue is, can we
afford not to? (National IT Working Committee,
1985, p. 45)
Another reason is economic survival, or rather
economic supremacy. To achieve this, a coun-
try’s workforce must have a firm grounding in
the language of the future, that is, science and
technology. (Prime Minister Goh Chok Tong, in
Nirmala, 1999, p. 78)
If we want to regain our competitive edge, IT is
an inescapable economic imperative. Likewise,
if we want to survive in the information age, we
better learn how to make a living out of IT. There
is no way that we can avoid this economic trans-
formation. The sooner we can reorientate out
thinking to cope with the challenges of IT, the
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better it is for everyone of us. (National IT
Working Committee, 1985, p. 46)
One particular informant, a finance executive from
an official government statutory board, stressed the
importance of information-communications technol-
ogy to the further integration of Singapore into the
global arena, not merely in economic but also in
sociocultural terms. However, she also personally ex-
pressed, “I would fear that one day we will find it diffi-
cult to live, or cannot live, to some absolute extent
[sic], without IT.”
Another informant, a research officer from a minis-
try, was more forthright and lucid:
Technology is the future for Singapore. Our lim-
ited workforce, land and high cost of production
means that we cannot compete with countries
like China and Indonesia to be a solely manufac-
turing or agricultural economy. The only hope is
to have a KBE [knowledge-based economy]
where IT plays an indispensable part. Our gov-
ernment is quite clear about this considering
their effort to push for more R&D [research and
development].
We might subsequently situate Intelligent Island
discourse within the discourses of what Ulrich Beck
(1992) calls “risk society.” The use of crisis and sur-
vival motifs share a close connection with the prob-
lems of articulating a national identity in Singapore’s
postcolonial condition because, at the onset of inde-
pendence, Singapore was more a state than a nation.
Formed as a consequence of formal decolonization
rather than a nationalist popular uprising (cf.
Hobsbawm, 1990, p. 171), the PAP government faced
the task of uniting an ethnically diverse immigrant
population and constructing a nationality. Historical
narratives of Singapore’s early years employ tropes of
this garrison mentality (Hill & Fee, 1995, p. 19; cf.
D. Brown, 1994), which is echoed early in Intelligent
Island discourse, given the economic recession of
1985-1986. Certainly, what was hoped to be induced
was the “mobilisation of a ‘rugged society,’ innovative
and technological in outlook” (Bedlington, 1978, p. 211).
A (re)definition of the nation was its (in)direct conse-
quence, informed by the discourses of postcoloniality
and globalization.
This site of negotiation suitably expresses Jurgen
Habermas’s (1989) deliberations on the fate of the
public sphere in late modernity, which has become
constricted with the expansion of bureaucracy to ever
more contexts of social life. Increasingly, he suggested
that the state seek to redefine problems as technical
and soluble by technologies and administrative proce-
dures rather than by public debate and argumentation
(Habermas, 1987b, 1988, 1989). This is profoundly
resonant with Intelligent Island discourse:
The pragmatism to which the national identity
refers is one of purposive rational action, one of
means-end calculation, one of technology and
science. Citizens are admonished to identify
with the economic success of the state which
demonstrates that the correct policies have been
applied. As these policies are not based on an
explicitly stated ideology nor even on purely
political considerations, but on rational and sci-
entific principles, any criticisms of these policies
can be branded as irrational. The prestige of sci-
ence and technology is thus used to buttress not
only the day to day policies but also the social
and political system resulting from such policies,
because leaders will ask if such a system is not
derived from the very principles of scientific and
rational action. The supremacy of this pragmatic
identity or technocratic consciousness can thus
be used to legitimize tight political control and
eventually an authoritarian political system.
(Chee & Evers, 1972, p. 317)
Habermas’s (1976) basic argument is that as the
state increasingly intervenes in the economy, it also
seeks to translate political issues into technical prob-
lems. Such issues are represented as technical prob-
lems that require the use of technologies by experts in
bureaucratic organization, rather than public debate, to
deal with the legitimation crises that recur in a capital-
istic system. To do this, Habermas believed, the state
propagates a technocratic consciousness that repre-
sents a new kind of ideology.13 This new ideology is a
prevalent and recurring premise in Intelligent Island
discourse.
This sense of urgency and crisis, however, is almost
overcome by the time the National Computer Board’s
Vision of an Intelligent Island (1992) is endorsed by
the government. The said report, for example, now
appropriates a more progressive rhetoric, one that is
specifically utopian, despite still appealing to the eco-
nomic dimension.
Lim / INTELLIGENT ISLAND DISCOURSE 185
Utopia and Articulating
the Nation
In particular, the texts and representations that con-
stitute Intelligent Island discourse have a specifically
utopian rhetoric that centers on a futuristic, high-
technology model to define the present rather than
with recourse to any explicitly historical narrative.
Karl Mannheim (1936, p. 97) described the conception
of utopia as an idea that “transcends the present and is
oriented to the future,” a negotiation of the present in
terms of an anticipated or desired future condition (cf.
Kumar, 1987, p. 388, 1991; Levitas, 1990, pp. 67-69,
1993; G. Rose, 1993). To this extent, it is argued that
the utopianism of Intelligent Island discourse is
directly but intricately connected to attempts at con-
structing a unitary idea of a nation. Contra strategies to
negotiate national identity in terms of a common past,
Intelligent Island discourse appropriates specifically
utopian conceptions of a future landscape of Singa-
pore as an Intelligent Island. In particular, this vision
of the future is informed to a large extent by discourses
of late modernity and, especially, confidence in a
technocapitalistic system.
Indeed, with meritocracy as one founding myth,
Singapore’s leaders “have to look towards the future
and the importance of economic achievements to artic-
ulate their conception of the nation” (Hill & Fee, 1995,
p. 31). With the task of abandoning (neo)colonial iden-
tities and negotiating viable alternatives in Singa-
pore’s formative years, the PAP government side-
stepped recourses to either regressive (by appealing to
a golden past) or progressive (by appealing to
ameliorative agendas) articulations of national iden-
tity, given the geopolitical contingencies of the time
(Hill & Fee, 1995, p. 19). Intelligent Island discourse,
however, has a distinctly utopian and progressive
dimension in its rhetoric because the same historical
conditions, at least in discourse, do not seem to apply.
It is in this sense that the utopian rhetoric of Intelligent
Island discourse does not take on the revolutionary
aspects of utopia that Mannheim (1936, p. 192) had
conceived but instead embodies a view of an urban
high-technology future that is idyllic but vibrant and
efficient, a model based on what Jean Baudrillard has
termed hyperreality.
A Home for the Future
This utopian picture of the future Intelligent Island
is no better portrayed than in the popularly advertised
community song “Moments of Magic” (Lim, 2000).
The corresponding music video features three popular
(Chinese) artists: Fann Wong, Tanya Chua, and Elsa
Lim, who sing of Singapore being a “city of friends”
that will bring “moments of magic.” What is particu-
larly interesting is in how the music video charts out
Singapore’s transition from her infancy to a future as a
high-technology information hub. The three artists are
framed dancing on a backdrop of computer binary
codes (0s and 1s) while accelerated footage of high-
way traffic captures a bustling and vibrant urbanity.
What is expressed through these portions of the
video, at once, are that (a) Singapore’s transition into
an Intelligent Island is not merely inevitable but also
desirable because she will be a lively and prosperous
“city of friends,” (b) that the future is one that is neces-
sarily equated with science and technology, and (c) that it
is a future (“a brand new day awaits”) which all Singa-
poreans can, and should, share and cherish (Lim, 2000).
Indeed, such progressive articulations of
u(rban)topia are equally, if not as provocatively,
mapped out in more physical texts. For example,
Information is the currency of the new age . . . life
can be much more rewarding—not just in a busi-
ness and economic sense but also to enhance
quality-of-life. (National Computer Board, 1992,
p. vii)
The NLB [National Library Board] plays a critical
role in helping to transform our society into a
learning nation, and our tiny island into a global
and regional business hub. We are confident of
creating the borderless library of the future envis-
aged by the Library 2000 Report, which will help
propel Singapore into the next millennium.
(www.lib.gov.sg/info/nlboverview/index.html)
The role of information-communications technol-
ogy is presented as crucial to this future. The IDA
(n.d.) brochure Catalyst for Change affirms that this
creates value:
For a brighter tomorrow. . . . Like sand which
stimulates an oyster to produce a lustrous pearl,
IDA will create value for Singapore’s economy.
And like a pearl that emerges from the oyster—an
object of great value—Singapore too, will emerge
as a dynamic city, a vibrant info-communications
hub, and a key player in the world economy.
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The appropriation of discourses on the global na-
ture of such technologies also suggests that the eco-
nomic dimension of the Intelligent Island is one of the
decisive components of this “home of the future”:
With Singapore positioned as a vast information
“gateway,” the country can also become a global
hub attractive to companies with global opera-
tions and to experts in numerous fields who can
apply their expertise world-wide. Things can be
done much faster and with higher quality.
(National Computer Board, 1992, p. viii)
The elaboration of this home of the future, with its
corresponding visions of a high-technology urbanity,
articulate a common destiny for Singapore(ans) and it
is this conception of utopia that serves as a unifying
factor in the nation-building process. This process is
reflected through several representations:
1. The boundaries of the nation-state are redrawn
and redefined despite (or perhaps because of)
the force of global flows of information-
communications technology. The Intelligent Is-
land is presented as a unitary entity, an intercon-
nected and all-wired body electronic.
2. This unified entity is simultaneously informed
by discourses of late modernity (ideas of prog-
ress and development) and postcoloniality
(defining the nation-state), and appropriates
discourses of globalization (an awareness of
a global condition) and technocapitalism (re-
liance on science, technology, and the free
market).
3. The common destiny of evolving into an Intel-
ligent Island and regional and global info-
communications hub (with its corresponding
social and economic benefits) orients national
identity toward a common goal, at some point in
the future, instead of a common past or heritage.
4. In particular, Intelligent Island discourse discards
Singapore’s colonial legacy—it suggests and
promises that the days of ethnic unrest and eco-
nomic scarcity are over, that an efficient, prosper-
ous, and democratic future is on the horizon.
5. This utopia can only be achieved by the success-
ful exploitation of the relevant technologies
with the correct attitude and cooperation of its
people.
Links With Other
Discursive Formations
Of course, the utopian dimension of Intelligent
Island discourse does not exist alone. Instead, there are
other conceptions of Singapore in the future that serve
to support and are appropriated by Intelligent Island
discourse.
In a recent speech at the launch of the Millennium
MRT Train, A/P Yaacob Ibrahim, Parliamentary Sec-
retary for Communications and Information Technol-
ogy, mapped out six broad utopian visions for the na-
tion, among which was Tech 2000:
Images of the satellite and space shuttle on the
Tech 2000 carriage encourage our youths to face
the high-tech future with confidence. We must be
passionate in what we do and embrace the spirit
of lifelong learning in the IT age. These images
remind us that a quality telecommunications ser-
vices and infrastructure is crucial to our leading
position as a business and financial hub.
(www.m2000.com.sg/news.htm)
However, this vision of an Intelligent Island also
runs with another five carriages of the Millennium
Train’s “Shared Heritage, Common Vision” program:
“Singapore 2000,” “Harmony 2000,” “Arts 2000,”
“Sports 2000,” and “Countdown 2000.” As such, we
may suggest that the utopian vision mapped out in In-
telligent Island is part of broader strategies to map out
a utopian vision for Singapore, in other words, part of
broader processes of postcolonial nation-building and
(re)defining national citizenship.
Another program recently embarked on is in re-
shaping Singapore into a Renaissance city that is dis-
cursively represented to be compatible with her vision
of an Intelligent Island:
Singapore will be benchmarking itself against
leading arts cities, such as New York and Lon-
don, in its bid to become a Renaissance City in
the next millennium. (Ng, 1999, p. 2)14
Information and the Arts Minister, Lee Yock Suan,
stated that this was part of efforts to achieve the coun-
try’s goals of becoming a vibrant arts city and a media
hub for the region and the world:
We want to encourage more research and devel-
opment, and the introduction of new broadcast-
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ing and multi-media products and services in
Singapore. (Ng, 1999, p. 2)
To this extent, we can make some observations as to
how Intelligent Island discourse is connected and co-
terminous with other discursive formations. First, it is
supported and made compatible with other utopian vi-
sions in (re)negotiating the boundaries (or mental
maps) of the nation—a New Model Singapore. Sec-
ond, although it is presented as an unfolding narrative,
there is a complex and intricate relationship in the on-
going construction of an imagined community. Third,
the formation of these discourses and the links that we
can make between them should be seen as part of
broader attempts to negotiate a postcolonial national
identity and culture, through the use of utopian rheto-
ric and strategies in discourse.
Conclusion
To reiterate, this article traces the narratives and dis-
courses that constitute how one may productively
speak of Singapore as an Intelligent Island. In particu-
lar, I have argued that our traditional categories of
information or technology have to be problematized—
Intelligent Island discourse should be situated histori-
cally by being sensitive to how the discourses of
postcoloniality, globalization, late modernity, and
technocapitalism have opened a discursive site in
which such a discourse is even possible. In this partic-
ular space, I have also traced how Intelligent Island
discourse is invested by and appropriates broad strate-
gies of nation-building and defining national identity
in Singapore’s postcolonial condition. The discursive
site of the body electronic sees a shift in political dis-
course from mobilizing a common past to negotiating
a utopian future and how the discourse on technology
has made this reorientation possible and feasible. In
particular, it is how the rhetoric of crisis and survival
and the articulation of a high-technology utopia are
strategically deployed and disseminated in the various
tropes, imagery, and texts that constitute Singapore as
an Intelligent Island.
Notes
1. The National IT Plan defines information technology (IT) as
“the use of computer telecommunication and office systems tech-
nologies for the collection, processing, storing, packaging and dis-
semination of information” (National IT Working Committee,
1985, p. 4). I shall be using information technology and informa-
tion-communications technology (ICT) interchangeably through-
out this article. Indeed, the deployment of the categories IT, ICT,
and technology are often conflated in Intelligent Island discourse.
It is my argument that this abstract categorization of technology in
Intelligent Island discourse is appropriated by extra-technological
discourses that organize and discipline ongoing cultural practices.
2. I fully acknowledge the fact that these theorists come from
radically differing academic traditions or perhaps, like Jean
Baudrillard, reject all academic traditions to begin with. The im-
portant point to make in this cacophony of academic consensus,
disputes, theorizing, theoretical and methodological disagree-
ments, even insults is the fact that they all speak of this thing called
“technology” and its complex relationship with the body social. As
in Intelligent Island discourse, the perspective we take does not in-
volve taking any particular side but to interrogate the
sociohistorical conditions on which this discourse is even possible,
can even be negotiated. It is certainly my contention that the ques-
tion concerning technology cannot be divorced from the
sociopolitical-cultural discourses that appropriate and invest Intel-
ligent Island discourses.
3. Operationalizing these four categories/discourses and appro-
priating them in a model, of course, does not imply that they are of
equal weight, representation or standing, or that they have an equal
impact and force on Intelligent Island discourse—I contend that
these discourses share an asymmetrical, and perhaps even antago-
nistic, relationship. It is out of this complex, conflicting relation
that a discursive site is negotiated, out of which Intelligent Island
discourse is possible. There are certainly overlapping spheres be-
tween the dimensions of postcolonialism, globalization, late mo-
dernity, and technocapitalism, and at times, the lines between them
are difficult (perhaps as they should be) to draw. However, it would
certainly be erroneous to assume that any one of these discourses
necessarily implies the other(s).
4. Indeed, Robertson (1995, p. 30) contends that “the concept
of globalisation had involved the simultaneity and the
interpenetration of what are conventionally called the global and
the local, or—in more abstract vein—the universal and the particu-
lar” and argues that the term glocalization would be more appro-
priate, to the extent that the local is not best seen, as least as an ana-
lytic or interpretative departure point, as a counterpoint to the
global—“Indeed [the local] can be regarded . . . as an aspect of
globalization” (p. 30).
5. Indeed, the development of the sovereignty of the modern
state from its beginnings depends on a “reflexively monitored set
of relations between states” (Giddens, 1985, p. 256) and can be
conceived to be “guided by increasingly global norms concerning
its sovereignty” (Robertson, 1990, p. 23). However, Robertson
(1990, p. 28) certainly suggests that there is general autonomy and
logic to the globalization process that operates in relative inde-
pendence of strictly societal and other more conventionally studied
sociocultural processes.
6. I am grateful to Tim Bunnell from the Department of Geogra-
phy, National University of Singapore, for providing two critical
papers of his study on Malaysia’s Multimedia Super Corridor as
well as for a critical discussion involving Foucault’s work on
governmentality. Two general directions can be ascertained from
this line of investigation (Foucault, 1991; Burchell, Gordon, &
Miller, 1991), which build on and critically respond to Foucault’s
earlier archaeological and genealogical works. First,
governmentality indicated an elaboration of his former conception
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of the “microphysics of power” (Foucault, 1979, 1980) to encom-
pass the macrolevel government of whole populations. Second,
Foucault’s work on governmentality was a rejoinder to critiques
that his representation of power in social relations “seemed to pre-
clude the possibility of meaningful action” (Gordon, 1991, p. 4).
7. From here on, the emphases (in italics) in lexias and infor-
mants’ responses are mine unless otherwise indicated.
8. Eddie Kuo (1990, pp. 31-42), for example, maps out the
“trends of informatisation” in Singapore by distinguishing the de-
grees of informatization (a) of the information capability of the
population, (b) of the communication/information networks and
infrastructure (what we might broadly refer to as the infostructure),
and (c) of the information sector itself.
9. Note that this precariousness is not particular to Intelligent
Island discourse but is reiterated and dispersed within several dis-
cursive domains that invest the life-world of Singaporeans. Thus,
although the promise of technology presents certain social,
epistemological disjunctures, there are underlying continuities
where this rhetoric of crisis and survival is articulated.
10. “The future is available now” is the opening page for the of-
ficial Singapore ONE Web site (www.s-one.gov.sg). It is hard not
to see the rhetorical, not to mention the aesthetic, elements in ap-
pealing to the idea of the future of information-communications
technology being available now in Singapore. For one reason, it al-
ready portrays a reality of a high technology formation in Singa-
pore ready to be exploited and with the potential for immense eco-
nomic as well as social benefits.
11. This also suggests that Singapore is going to reach this fu-
ture, this tomorrow before any other country. This line of sugges-
tion (Singapore’s “before-ness”) is consistent with state rhetoric
that continuously enforces a drive to be the best in the world,
whether it is the world’s busiest port, busiest airport, or the
“World’s Most Intelligent City.” The Vision of an Intelligent Island
(National Computer Board, 1992) can be set against Malaysia’s
Multimedia Super Corridor, in a bid to achieve this high-technol-
ogy urbanity before her regional competitors.
12. This rhetoric of crisis and survival is, of course, not particu-
lar to Singapore (see Dirks, 1992) or Intelligent Island discourse.
However, that is precisely the point because my argument is that
Intelligent Island discourse is part of broader attempts at na-
tion-building. Heng and Devan’s (1995) reading of the politics of
eugenics in Singapore traverses similar lines:
Postcolonial governments are inclined, with some predict-
ability, to generate narratives of national crisis, driven per-
haps—the generous explanation—to reenact periodically
the state’s traumatic if also liberating separation from colo-
nial authority, a moment catachrestically founding the na-
tion itself qua nation. Typically, however, such narratives of
crisis serve more than one category of reassurance: by re-
peatedly focusing anxiety on the fragility of the new nation,
its ostensible vulnerability to every kind of exigency, the
state’s originating agency is periodically reinvoked and rati-
fied, its access to wide-ranging instruments of power in the
service of national protection continually consolidated. It is
a post-Foucauldian truism that they who successfully define
and superintend a crisis, furnishing its lexicon and discur-
sive parameters, successfully confirm themselves the own-
ers of power, the administration of crisis operating to revi-
talise ownership of instruments of power even as it
vindicates the necessity of their use. (p. 196, emphasis
added)
13. Habermas (1976) was certainly of the opinion that unlike
previous ideologies, a technocratic consciousness does not prom-
ise a future utopia but is seductive in its ability to veil problems, to
simplify perceived options, and to justify a particular way of orga-
nizing social life. As will be apparent in the following section,
Habermas is not explicit about the exact relationship between ide-
ology and utopia—a problem I try to resolve by appealing to Karl
Mannheim’s (1936) sociology of knowledge. I argue that this tech-
nocratic consciousness in Intelligent Island discourse subse-
quently appropriates a utopian rhetoric, which should be seen as
part of broader strategies of nation-building and (re)defining na-
tional identity in postcolonial Singapore.
14. This benchmarking obviously works around an Orientalist
logic (cf. Said, 1978) by subscribing to modernist notions of the
centers of civilization (e.g., New York, London, Paris, etc.). This is
in sharp contrast to Singapore’s efforts to define her identity as a
postcolonial nation-state given the autonomy and logic of global-
ization. It is precisely that postcolonial discourse sits uncomfort-
ably with the discourse on national identity that we can interrogate
Singapore’s postcolonial condition because, as Gupta (1998) con-
tends, discourses on colonialism, neocolonialism and
postcolonialism share an asymmetrical and contentious relation-
ship given the conditions of globalization and technocapitalism.
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